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Domination, resistance and
accommodation in China’s
one-child campaign
Tyrene White

In 1949, as the Chinese Communist Party was poised to establish its new
regime, China’s population numbered nearly half a billion, a staggering
number that many believed would prove an unbearable drag on attempts to
develop. It was two decades, however, before China began to make population
control a state priority. In the early-1970s, birth limits were set at two or
three children. By 1979, however, China’s post-Mao leaders had become so
concerned about the likely impact of population growth on their new
development plans that they took the extreme step of launching a one-childper-couple policy—the most extensive, aggressive and effective attempt ever
made to subject child-bearing to direct state control and regulation.
Looking back, China’s leaders and demographers argue that the two-decade
delay after 1949 was a fateful mistake. By the time the state began to encourage
fertility control, a huge new generation of young people had already been
born and were approaching their child-bearing years. As a result, even with
declining fertility levels (i.e., the average number of children born to a woman
during her reproductive years), demographic momentum and improved health
meant continued growth of total population size. In 1979, China’s population
hit the one billion mark, and by the century’s end it had risen to nearly 1.27
billion despite aggressive enforcement of birth limits. The goal for 2010 is
to contain population size at 1.36 billion, on the way to a predicted peak of
about 1.6 billion somewhere around the middle of the twenty-ﬁrst century.
This expansion will continue to occur even though China’s demographic
transition from a high-fertility, high-mortality society to a low-fertility, lowmortality society is largely complete.1
No demographic transition can be explained by a single variable, and
China’s transition is no exception. The sudden and rapid decline in fertility,
which occurred after 1970 in both urban and rural areas, suggests the strong
inﬂuence of population control policies enacted at that time. Other factors
were also at work, however. By the 1970s, improvements in levels of socioeconomic development, education and communication networks meant that
more people were aware of the option of birth control. Moreover, infant
mortality had declined, while the cost of child rearing had gone up. In urban
areas, living space was cramped and scarce, and the “iron rice bowl” of state
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employment meant secure, if modest, retirement pensions and health beneﬁts.
For the ﬁrst time, young urban couples were released from the prospect that
a secure old age depended on producing male children. A growing proportion
of women worked full-time, only to pull a second shift of housework, cooking
and child care at home. Although data on this period remain very scarce,
there can be little doubt that these changes, particularly in urban areas, began
to affect individual calculations about how many children were desirable.
As demographers have seen elsewhere, once the idea of smaller family size
begins to take hold, it can spread very rapidly within a particular cultural
and social context.
With 80 percent of the population living in the countryside, however, it
took more than socioeconomic development and attitudinal changes to bring
fertility rates down so rapidly. After 1970, six forms of state intervention
were used:
1
2
3
4
5
6

free access to contraceptives, abortion and sterilization
promulgation and enforcement of late marriage guidelines, raising the
average age at marriage from 22 in 1970 to 25 by 1979 (Banister 1987)
use of material incentives and penalties to encourage compliance with
birth limits
a mass campaign to promote smaller families and enforce birth limits
the creation of a large family planning bureaucracy to implement birth
control guidelines; and
the inclusion of population targets in the national economic planning
process.

Making population targets a part of the central planning process in 1971
marked the culmination of a long internal political battle over how to view
China’s large and growing population. In 1949, Mao Zedong viewed population as an asset. Like Marx, he believed that the exploitative class systems
of feudalism and imperialism, not overpopulation, were the causes of poverty,
disease and unemployment. By the mid-1950s, however, the shock of China’s
ﬁrst census results, combined with lagging levels of agricultural output, led
other Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders (including Zhou Enlai and
Deng Xiaoping) to urge the abandonment of China’s pro-natalist policy and
the promotion of voluntary birth control. Just as a public birth control campaign got under way, however, the programme was swept aside by the Great
Leap Forward (1958–60), a radical campaign that promised prosperity but
produced instead a devastating famine and an estimated fifteen to thirty
million excess deaths.
Paradoxically, it was during this period of mobilization prior to the Great
Leap that the core idea behind China’s approach to population control took
shape. Though Mao remained suspicious of the arguments for birth control
and had a direct hand in pre-empting the ﬂedgling campaign, it was he who
suggested in 1957 that China should attempt to plan reproduction in the
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same way it aspired to plan material production (White 1994). At the time,
birth planning (jihua shengyu), i.e. the attempt to regulate population growth
so as to keep it in balance with levels of economic production and growth,
was only a goal to be reached at some more advanced stage of socialist
development. As China’s population continued to grow, however, key leaders
such as Premier Zhou Enlai came to believe that birth planning could not
be postponed. In the early-1960s, after the disastrous Great Leap Forward,
Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai attempted to revive the birth control campaign,
and in 1965 Zhou proposed the ﬁrst national population control target—
reducing the annual rate of population growth to 1 percent by the end of the
century. This second campaign, like the ﬁrst, was aborted by the Cultural
Revolution, but Zhou revived it with new urgency in the early-1970s, creating
an extensive family planning bureaucracy to oversee implementation,
providing free access to contraceptives, abortions and sterilizations, and
introducing speciﬁc population targets into the annual and ﬁve-year economic
plans. Socialist planning thus came to embrace human reproduction in much
the same way that it embraced agricultural and industrial production. Local
ofﬁcials who were responsible for meeting grain and steel production quotas
now began to receive quotas for babies.
In the early- and mid-1970s, the campaign focus was “later, longer, fewer,”
i.e. promoting later marriage, longer spacing between births (three to ﬁve
years), and fewer births (a two-child ideal and a three-child limit). By middecade, the childbearing norm began to tighten; the new slogan was “one is
not too few, two is enough, three is too many.” Even that policy was judged
too lenient by the new Deng Xiaoping regime which came to power in 1978.
In 1979, China’s top demographers and scientists announced that if China
were to achieve its economic goals by the year 2000, population had to be
contained within 1.2 billion. To achieve that goal, the ofﬁcial birth limit was
lowered to one child per couple (with some exceptions for special circumstances), and all child-bearing age couples, urban and rural, had to receive
ofﬁcial birth permits from the state in order to give birth legally. Provinces
drafted regulations offering economic incentives to encourage policy
compliance and imposing stiff sanctions on policy violators right down to
the village and community level.
In China’s cities and towns, growing acceptance of the small-family norm,
reinforced by the late-marriage policy and tight administrative control in
workplaces and neighborhoods, had brought the urban total fertility rate
down from 3.3 in 1970 to about 1.5 by 1978, a remarkably low level for a
developing country. With a large cohort of women about to enter their peak
child-bearing years, however, the state deemed even this low level inadequate.
To further suppress fertility and prevent more second births, state monitoring
intensified in workplaces and neighborhoods. Monthly gynaecological
examinations for child-bearing age women, plus a system of marriage and
birth permits provided by the work unit, ensured that anyone attempting to
have a second child was caught in a tight surveillance net. Those who
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escaped the net faced severe penalties, including ﬁnes, loss of employment
and perhaps even their coveted urban household registration.
If changing child-bearing preferences and state control worked together to
induce compliance with the one-child policy in urban China, rural China
posed a far more difﬁcult challenge. Like rural populations in other places
and times, life in the countryside encouraged higher levels of fertility. Agricultural work requires household labor, and unlike their urban counterparts, even very young rural children can be put to work in the service of
family income. Moreover, while urban retirees could depend on a state pension
for retirement support, rural families had no such welfare structure. Children
were the only guarantee of old-age support, and the most destitute villagers
were inevitably those who were alone and childless. Only a son could assure
a couple that they would be spared such a fate. Daughters usually married
out of the village, transportation links were often poor, and upon marriage a
daughter’s ﬁrst obligation transferred to her husband’s family. Even the most
devoted daughter could not be counted on to provide either income or assistance. In urban areas, in contrast, nearby residency and convenient transportation allowed married daughters to be valuable assets to aging parents.
In addition to these practical considerations, the traditional emphasis on
bearing sons to carry on the ancestral line remained deeply entrenched in
the countryside. As a result, although rural fertility levels were cut in half
between 1971 and 1979 (declining from approximately six to three), much
of rural China remained hostile to a two- or one-child limit, including the
rural cadres who would have to enforce the policy.2 When the rural reforms
implemented after 1978 began to relax the state’s administrative grip on the
peasantry just as the one-child policy was launched, therefore, it set the stage
for a prolonged and intense struggle over the control of child bearing.
A substantial scholarship on China’s birth planning programme has examined the process of policy evolution and implementation at the national and
local levels, and the means by which the state has succeeded in meeting its
fertility goals and overriding resistance (Greenhalgh, 1990, 1994; Greenhalgh
and Winckler, 2005; Greenhalgh, Zhu and Li, 1994; Li, 1995; White, 1990,
1991, 1994). Societal resistance, though pervasive and widespread, especially
in the countryside, has received less systematic attention.3 Still less attention
has been given to the question of whether, and to what degree, societal
resistance has shaped or inﬂuenced the evolution of policy.
Given the scale of grassroots resistance to China’s population policy, this
lacuna in the literature is odd. After all, rarely has there been a case in which
the evidence of resistance is so manifest and easy to measure. Though violations of the birth plan are by no means the only form of resistance, the tens
of millions of such births that have occurred over the past two decades are
a living testament to just how widespread and sustained the resistance has
been. By the mid-1990s, the state had nevertheless succeeded in pushing the
total fertility rate down to the remarkably low level of 1.8. The case of birth
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planning in China thus confronts us with the apparent paradox of what appears
to be a strong state and a strong society.
How can that be? Early models of state–society relations generally assumed
that the distribution of power between state and society was zero sum; as
the state gained in power, society lost, and vice versa. More recent formulations
question this model, however, and emphasize instead the vague and overlapping boundaries between ‘state’ and ‘society’, and the internal conﬂicts
that can weaken state authority.4 In this case, tight fertility control applied
to all childbearing age couples, whether they were state ofﬁcials in Beijing
or poor peasants in a remote village. Party members, family planning ofﬁcials
and rural cadres were asked to set an example by taking the lead in embracing
the one-child limit. Those past their child-bearing years were pressed to see
that their children and relatives complied. The signiﬁcance of this fact—that
no one was left untouched by the policy—cannot be overstated. It meant
that the state was at least as vulnerable to resistance from within its own
ranks as it was to societal resistance. The struggle over child-bearing, then,
has been more than a struggle by the state to dominate society’s child-bearing.
It has also been a prolonged struggle to contain and eliminate resistance at
every level of state administration, particularly at the local level.
The limitations of a zero-sum, state-society model of power relations are
also revealed by the dynamic nature of resistance strategies. As socioeconomic
and political conditions have undergone continual change during the reform
era, so too have the strategies of resistance, which can take three basic
forms: confrontation, evasion, and accommodation. Acts of confrontation
and evasion are commonly used tools in social movements of all types and
sizes, and resistance to birth limits is no exception. Less common, however,
is the strategy of accommodation. This strategy is most likely to be seen
when a strong state is capable of extracting compliance, but not capable of
eliminating acts of resistance that nevertheless undercut and subvert state
purposes. In this case, couples who were caught between state demands to
limit childbearing to only one or two children, and cultural and social pressures
to have a son, attempted to resolve the conflict by resorting to female
infanticide, or more commonly, female infant abandonment and sex-selective
abortion. Others chose to defy the child-bearing limit by engaging in willful
but technically legal deﬁance, while accommodating the state’s demands
that they pay a steep “social compensation fee” for doing so. Though strategies
of accommodation avoid the dangers of direct confrontation, they remain
important political actions that reveal vividly the extent to which the right
to engineer fertility remains contested political terrain.

Patterns of resistance
Before exploring each pattern of resistance, it is important to recognize that
the one-child limit has been strictly and consistently enforced only in China’s
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cities and towns, and only among ethnically Han Chinese. In the countryside,
where the policy was met with hostility and widespread resistance, intense
pressures to comply in the early years of the campaign gave way in 1984
to a “one-son or two-child policy.” In other words, those whose ﬁrst child
was a daughter were allowed to try again—for a son—after a four- or ﬁveyear wait between pregnancies. In the mid- and late-1980s, some provinces
and regions relaxed the policy even more, allowing peasants to have two
children, if properly spaced. Ofﬁcially, these two-child provisions were usually
limited to peasants living in poor, remote or mountainous areas, but the
relaxation sometimes spilled over into more prosperous areas. A tough new
wave of enforcement in the 1990s tried to rein in those who had exceeded
their ofﬁcial birth quotas and reimpose a strict one-son or two-child policy,
but stiff enforcement provoked stiff resistance and mounting conﬂict. Calls
for policy reform grew more widespread in the late-1990s and early-2000s,
but fears of a fertility rebound led policy-makers to reject any change to the
ofﬁcial national policy. Still, the social context of the 2000s was a world
away from that of the 1980s, as China came to face severely skewed sex
ratios due to female abortion, a migrant population of more than one hundred
million, frequent and widespread confrontations between villagers or workers
and local ofﬁcials, and a new generation coming of age that was itself the
product of the one-child policy. What they did support was a modified
approach to enforcement that relied more on education and positive incentives
than heavy-handed, target-driven enforcement tactics, Despite widespread
trials of this new, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)-supported model,
however, old habits died slowly. Targets did not disappear, and local ofﬁcials
were still judged on whether they had met birth-planning targets for the year.
Rather than solve the conﬂict over child-bearing, then, the ofﬁcial retreat
from harsh enforcement methods engendered new forms of conflict and
resistance.
Strategies of confrontation
The determination of the state after 1979 to prevent any “unplanned” birth,
but especially third or higher order births (duotai), by pressing hard for
abortion, sterilization or IUD insertion, confronted millions of households
with the reality of state intrusion into the heart of family life. Families who
saw child-bearing as their best long-term guarantee of strength, dignity and
stature in the village (and their best defence against weakness, bullying and
abuse by powerful families or clans), understood that birth limits profoundly threatened their future security. Little wonder, then, that attempts
to round up pregnant women could provoke direct and often violent
confrontation.
Violence and the threat of violence against birth planning ofﬁcials escalated
in the early-1980s, as pressures to limit childbirth increased dramatically.
Irate husbands attacked birth planning ofﬁcials who pressured their wives
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or relatives to have abortions. Others were assaulted out of anger over botched
abortions, sterilizations or IUD insertions, and the failure of local ofﬁcials
to provide sufﬁcient follow-up health care. The attacks were often directed
against female cadres or doctors, who were frequently on the front-lines of
implementation. In some cases, they were attacked and killed by bereaved
family members. In one case, reported in Hubei Daily in April 1982, a
doctor who reported a woman with a third pregnancy to the commune
authorities was attacked by the woman’s husband after he was ﬁred from
his job. Eight family members joined him in the beating, one of whom was
the brigade party secretary.5
In the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s, as reform loosened the
choke-hold of rural cadres on peasant livelihood, rural conﬂict soared. In
Suining county of Jiangsu province, for example, there were a reported 381
“incidents of revenge” between January 1987 and May 1988, one-third of
them directly related to birth planning.6 All of these incidents involved physical
attacks on cadres by angry peasants, but there were also numerous attacks
on property. Since cadres sometimes seized or destroyed peasant property
in order to deter or punish birth planning offences, peasants retaliated in
kind, destroying crops on cadres’ land, killing their chickens or pigs, and
damaging their homes and furnishings. These attacks became so frequent
that one Henan county passed a law explicitly banning such acts of retaliation.7
Provinces began to follow suit, including provisions in their revised birth
planning regulations for punishing those who “insult, beat up, or slander
birth planning personnel and their families” (Shaanxi) or “humiliate, threaten,
beat up, or retaliate against” birth planning cadres (Guizhou). 8 Such measures
were hardly effective, however. As the number of strikes, protests and
demonstrations by peasants soared in the 1990s and 2000s, ruthless
enforcement of the birth control policy ranked high on the list of villagers’
complaints. When local ofﬁcials were pressed by their superiors to tighten
implementation and crack down on “unplanned” births, villagers sometimes
struck back by attacking village or township authorities en masse.9 In 2007,
for example, villagers in Bobai County, Guangxi Autonomous Region,
attacked authorities who had been conducting a two-month long crackdown
on illegal births. The crackdown was part of a local campaign to improve
the area’s birth planning performance, and cadres were motivated to meet
campaign targets by whatever means necessary. Women who were pregnant
without permission were rounded up for abortions; if they resisted, their
relatives or children were taken away and held as ransom until they complied.
To meet sterilization quotas, women who used other means of birth control
were ordered in for tubal ligations, or their husbands for vasectomies. Fines
ranging from 500 to 70,000 yuan were levied against policy violators, even
if the unplanned birth had occurred as early as 1980, and even if ﬁnes for
the same offense had been levied and paid in the past. Widespread use of
these tactics, combined with grievances over other local cadre abuses, led
villagers to respond with a massive protest that turned violent and deadly.10
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In other cases, villagers used tactics that were less violent but equally
effective. In a village in Yunnan province, for example, rural women caught
up in a 1994 campaign that forced them into undergoing sterilizations bullied
and harassed the village party secretary for his role in assisting township
authorities in carrying out the campaign. The women followed him around
the village, and made demands that he personally provide compensation for
the permanent loss of health and vitality resulting from sterilization, and
help them with daily chores they were now unable to do for themselves.
The inexperienced leader, who was compared unfavorably to the leader of
a neighboring village who had managed to deﬂect the township authorities
and the campaign, and whose own wife’s health was compromised when he
pressed her to set an example by being the ﬁrst to be sterilized, was eventually
driven to attempt suicide.11
By the late-1990s, this type of direct confrontation was overlaid by a second
type of confrontational resistance. As villagers became more aware of state
laws protecting their rights, and more emboldened to act in defence of those
rights, they began to appeal to the law and the courts to protect them from
abusive enforcement practices, or to punish those who had perpetrated them
(see chapters by Ho, Zweig and Friedman). This type of resistance, which
Kevin O’Brien has termed “rightful” or rights-based resistance, became an
option for villagers in the late-1990s as a direct by-product of state efforts
to ease cadre–peasant tensions over tax collection and to improve rural
governance.12 Unable to force peasants to pay the fees and taxes that padded
local coffers, cadres frequently resorted to the same coercive and punitive
methods that they used to enforce birth limits to squeeze out taxes, seizing
or destroying property and using intimidation and violence to gain compliance.
As tensions mounted in the 1990s, the state repeatedly issued regulations
that outlawed such methods of tax collection and held cadres accountable
for violations. This provoked a similar ban by the State Family Planning
Commission (subsequently renamed the National Commission for Population
and Family Planning).
Meanwhile, the implementation of village-level elections in many areas
in the 1990s led to growing consciousness among villagers of laws regarding
village self-management, and some began to seize on the law and their legal
rights as morally grounded means of redress against abusive ofﬁcials.13 This
led some to seek legal redress against family planning enforcers, even in
cases where the complainants were in violation of the policy. In one widely
reported case, for example, a couple in suburban Harbin with three boys
submitted under pressure to a late-term abortion, only to have the baby survive
the procedure. Hospital and family planning ofﬁcials kept the baby from the
parents and reportedly ordered that the baby be left to die. Irate nurses
and staff members refused to cooperate, however, and journalists reported
the story. The parents were eventually reunited with the baby and a group
of hospital staff ﬁled an ofﬁcial police report. The hospital director was
investigated on charges of intent to murder and removed from her post, but
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vowed to sue two journalists for “untruthful reporting.” Although media
attention was critical in exposing this case, what is noteworthy is the extent
to which the rural couple applied the rights-based logic of the journalists.
(See the chapter by Lee for other examples of rights-based suits.) Offered
hush money by local ofﬁcials to cover the excess-birth ﬁne and to move
away from the village, the baby’s father refused, saying “we didn’t trust
them. We trust the journalists who told us the hospital violated our rights.
If necessary, we’ll go to court to be witnesses . . . we want justice.”14 This
rights-based defence will not protect those who wilfully violate the policy
and refuse to comply with birth limits, but it may give pause to ofﬁcials
who enforce those limits or punish violators after the fact.
The most widely reported case of rights-based confrontation occurred in
Shandong province in 2005. Responding to requests from residents of Linyi
City, Chen Guangcheng, a blind, self-trained lawyer whose home village
was in the Linyi suburbs, investigated the use of coercive methods to
implement local policies and meet birth planning targets. According to reports,
more than 7,000 abortions and sterilizations were performed in the spring
of 2005 after provincial authorities complained about poor local performance
in controlling births. Many of these procedures occurred only after relatives
had been detained or beaten in an attempt to coerce compliance, and in other
cases, property was destroyed or conﬁscated. These were the same methods
that had been outlawed under the national population and family planning
law, and been repudiated (under threat of administrative sanction or criminal
prosecution) by the family planning bureaucracy. After discussing the events
with many local families, Chen attempted to ﬁle a class action lawsuit, but
was blocked by local authorities. When Chen later visited Beijing to draw
attention to the case and confer with supporting lawyers, he was seized off
the street by Shandong authorities, returned to his home and held under
house arrest, pending formal charges. Chen was eventually tried, convicted
and imprisoned, and the lawsuit was quashed. He remained in prison as of
mid-2009.15
Strategies of evasion
The most common strategy employed in resisting the one-child policy was
that of avoiding the detection of an “extra-plan” pregnancy until the child
has been born. Within this category, there were two further subtypes—the
independent evader, and the dependent one. Independent evaders attempted
to circumvent the birth limits without relying on the silent acquiescence or
active assistance of local ofﬁcials. Dependent evaders, in contrast, relied on
cadre collusion in order to succeed.
The simplest approach to avoiding detection was the attempt to time a
pregnancy for the autumn. As women bundled themselves in several layers
of clothing, or padded jackets, to protect against the winter cold, they were
able to hide the pregnancy for several months. Assuming no one in the
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village betrayed their secret, they might succeed in avoiding detection until
very late in the term or even until childbirth. Keeping the secret was difﬁcult,
however, and women leaders responsible for birth control counted on village
gossip to help with their work. Pregnant women usually told at least one
person about the pregnancy, often their mother-in-law. Once she knew,
however, she could not resist telling a friend. As the word spread, the women’s
leader discovered the pregnancy. How much pressure was brought to bear
upon the pregnant woman, however, depended on how quickly the women’s
leader reported the problem to higher-level authorities. A small delay could
mean the difference between getting caught or getting away, i.e. leaving the
village until the baby was born.
In other cases, women evaded detection by leaving the village altogether
until after the child was born. In the 1970s and early-1980s, this strategy
generally depended on having a relative or acquaintance outside one’s village
or town (ideally in a large county town or a city) with whom one could
board for the duration of the pregnancy. By the mid-1980s, however,
relaxations on travel and population movement led to the emergence of a
burgeoning army of temporary migrants that came to be known as the “ﬂoating
population.” Estimated at 100 million by the late-1990s, and over 150 million
by 2009, this migrant population deﬁed even the best efforts of birth control
ofﬁcials to keep track of their child-bearing. Those who were determined to
have another child, therefore, often joined the ranks of the migrants and
became part of the “guerilla birth corps.” The sound logic behind this strategy
was spelled out by a Yunnan villager:
Since I am from another locality and my residence is not registered here,
nobody here will interfere with how many children I am going to have
. . . [When I go home] I will simply say that I have picked up and
adopted an abandoned child here. Even if the residence of the child is
not allowed to be registered, it will not matter because the child will
then already be two or three years old. Somehow he will be recognized
as my son.16
Notice that for this plan to work, the story does not have to be believed. It
is sufﬁcient that village cadres will eventually accept the presence of this
additional child, a course accommodated by the fact that they will not be
held directly responsible for births outside their own village or township.
This villager was also counting on the failure of state efforts to crack down
on migrant offenders, efforts that grew more aggressive over the course of
the 1990s, particularly in major cities. Central and local regulations were
promulgated requiring birth permits as a condition of employment, and
obliging employers to monitor migrants to be sure they were in compliance
with family planning rules. Although some migrants were restrained by the
necessity of being certiﬁed by the local family planning bureaucracy that
they were in compliance with the one-child policy, many continued to fall
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through the net. This loophole was magniﬁed by a regulatory system that
placed migrants under the family planning jurisdiction of their registered
hometowns, not their temporary residence. This meant that migrants were
often required to return home to certify that they were still in compliance
with the one-child policy, that they were not pregnant, and that they were
using effective contraception or had been sterilized. Even when migrants
were prepared to comply with the request, they could neither afford the trip
if their home was some distance away, nor could they risk losing their job
because of absence, even when their absence was ofﬁcially required.
Given the enormous size of the migrant population, the failure to effectively
regulate them constituted a big loophole in the one-child policy. In 2009,
therefore, bureaucratic oversight of migrants was turned over to ofﬁcials in
their temporary place of residence, and their home districts were forbidden
to require migrants to return home for “inspection” or pay hometown ﬁnes.
In addition to gaining responsibility for migrant child-bearing, local family
planning ofﬁcials were now able to provide migrants with the same access
to free contraceptive methods and services that were available to residents.
Nevertheless, enforcing birth limits among migrants was more difﬁcult than
among women who remained in their registered village.
A third strategy was to bribe medical personnel to remove intrauterine
devices, normally implanted after the first birth. Some doctors began to
provide such services on a regular basis, while others faked the quarterly or
monthly gynaecological examination results, allowing “illegally” pregnant
women to go undetected. Still others could be paid to tie only one fallopian
tube during sterilization, or to provide false certiﬁcation of having undergone
sterilization (normally required after a second birth). In 1994, a former vicepresident of a county hospital in Hunan was executed for taking nearly
200,000 yuan in bribes between 1986 and 1991 in exchange for falsifying
448 sterilization certiﬁcates.17 Medical personnel were also implicated in
phoney certiﬁcation schemes. A couple was permitted to have a second child
if the ﬁrst was born with physical or mental disabilities that would prevent
the child from being a full-time laborer as an adult. This gave doctors
another opportunity for fraud, since they could certify a healthy child as a
disabled one.18 Similarly, ofﬁcial birth permits were controlled and issued
by birth planning cadres. Peasants who could not ﬁnd other ways around
the birth limit sometimes discovered that local ofﬁcials were willing to sell
the permits. In 1988, ofﬁcials in some localities were charging 1,600 yuan
for a permit.19
Another evasive strategy was to marry or cohabit unofﬁcially, without
receiving an ofﬁcial marriage permit or registering with the civil affairs
bureau. This was a strategy frequently employed by rural families anxious
to arrange marriages before their children had reached the legal ages of
20 for women and 22 for men. Since family planning ofﬁcials concentrated
their efforts on married women, those who were secretly married and sheltered
by their families were often able to become pregnant and give birth without
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detection. Nationwide, 6.1 million people had married under the legal age
by 1988. That ﬁgure translated into about 15 percent of all marriages, and
those marriages contributed about 10 percent of all births annually.20 By
1994, under-age marriages numbered 1.6 million annually, representing 16
percent of all marriages.21 This large number of illegal marriages could not
occur without the collusion of local ofﬁcials. Villagers paid hefty bribes to
acquire false certiﬁcations of age from village cadres or marriage certiﬁcates
from township ofﬁcials.
One of the most pervasive strategies used by cadres to cope with
enforcement pressures from above and resistance from below was the coverup—engaging in statistical fraud to hide excess births. Women known to
have given birth, but who did so outside the village, were left off local birth
rolls. Even those who gave birth in the village were sometimes omitted, and
the omission was covered up by refusing to issue a household registration
for the infant. Sending township ofﬁcials into a village did not necessarily
increase the likelihood of full disclosure. One former township cadre
complained that village leaders did everything they could to obstruct the
work of such teams. Village leaders warned peasants about the impending
visit by the team, giving offending couples a chance to ﬂee or hide. Village
leaders sometimes hid themselves so as to avoid confrontation. Other cadres
welcomed the team and accompanied it into the village, but their “assistance”
was actually resistance, their actions designed to minimize the team’s access
to accurate data and move it quickly out of the village. These tactics were
so effective that one former township ofﬁcial concluded that it was impossible
for outsiders to know the true state of affairs in a village.22
Township ofﬁcials did not always want to know the truth, however, since
exceeding the local birth quota would have a negative impact on the leaders’
work evaluations, salaries and bonuses. Family planning ofﬁcials learned
quickly that the local party secretary did not want to receive reports that
would reﬂect badly on the township or threaten its privileged standing as an
“advanced unit.” And zealous cadres who sought out fraud learned that they
would not be rewarded for “rectifying” a fraudulent statistical report. As one
former township cadre put it, an honest report would only destroy one’s own
career, since higher-level political leaders would be embarrassed and angered
by the revelation.23 He admitted that he had knowingly submitted false reports
rather than face the censure that would come with accurate accounting.
Another form of cadre–peasant collusion was to levy ﬁnes for unplanned
births rather than expend extra effort to prevent them. If grassroots women’s
leaders were unsuccessful in persuading a couple to abort an unauthorized
pregnancy, village leaders sometimes did little or nothing to reinforce their
efforts. This strategy allowed cadres to fulﬁl the letter of the law without
provoking major confrontations with villagers. They could make it clear that
heavy penalties would be levied after the child was born, but if that threat
was not a sufficient deterrent, no further efforts were made. Leaders in
some localities went further, implementing ﬁnes that were lower than those
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authorized by county or township regulations. In recent years, this strategy
has spread from villages into urban areas as high income couples have
simply paid very stiff ﬁnes in order to have a second child.
In cases where the ﬁrst child is a daughter, ofﬁcials often sympathize with
the parents. Cadres were particularly lenient with “single-daughter households”
(dunühu), or couples with two or more daughters but no sons. Sympathetic
to their plight, village cadres often made no effort at enforcement, even
refusing to impose ﬁnes if they gave birth to another girl. If couples violated
the policy and had a son, however, payment of ﬁnes was transformed into
a near-ritual performance. Cadres sent to collect the ﬁnes were received
happily, and couples paid the ﬁne as a part of the celebration over the birth.
As one brigade women’s leader said: “They [rural couples] want to have a
son. What can we do?”24
The same pattern prevailed with respect to sterilization. Pressed to meet
sterilization quotas for couples with two or more children, cadres made
every effort to avoid couples who had no sons. Even during major mobilizations like that of 1983, cadres worked to shield couples with no sons from
the campaign. Because of the extreme pressures to meet sterilization quotas,
they were not always successful in this effort, but during less intense periods
they had no difﬁculty bypassing them. In Xinyu City of Jiangxi province,
for example, more than 82 percent of duotai births in 1985 were to couples
with two or more daughters, including some with six or seven daughters.
These births occurred despite a major sterilization mobilization during 1983
and 1984, because cadres had been unwilling to impose permanent birth
control measures on couples without a son. Rather than resent the exceptions,
other couples, even those with sons who had been mobilized for sterilization,
tended to be sympathetic with this discriminating use of power.25 So severe
was the problem of ofﬁcial collusion that provinces and localities drafted
administrative regulations laying out punishments for various kinds of policy
violations. In 1998, for example, Hainan province drafted provisions for
punishing eight specific forms of collusion to violate the birth planning
rules, including all of those discussed above, and other provinces followed
suit. These local efforts were subsequently reinforced by similar provisions
in the national Population and Family Planning Law, which took effect in
September 2002.26
Strategies of accommodation
Situated between the confrontational (public) and evasive (hidden or disguised)
forms of resistance was a third pattern of response. Those desperate to have
a son sometimes resorted to female infanticide, female infant abandonment,
or, as the technology became available, sex-selective abortion, all prohibited
by the state despite the wish to control and reduce births. In one sense, this
pattern of accommodating state controls on child-bearing may seem to
be the ultimate evidence of state domination, an indicator of defeat and
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subordination rather than resistance. As James Scott argues, however, material
domination—in this case, control over the number of children one has—is
only one form of state domination. Transformative states also seek ideological
and status domination, or control over the realm of legitimate ideas and the
distribution of status and prestige within society.27 Despite the CCP’s massive
and prolonged effort to justify its claim to control child-bearing by
emphasizing the public and social costs of child-rearing and insisting that
population growth is an impediment to modernization, it has been unable to
overcome the inﬂuence of patriarchal culture. This competing world view,
which rests on family values that prioritize sons over daughters, and rests
on a compelling economic logic of son responsibility to care for parents in
their old age, places family loyalty and ﬁlial obligation above state ethical
or legal imperatives, continues to hold sway across rural China. The duty
to produce a son and male heir supersedes duty to the nation, a conviction
reinforced by the realignment of status and power since 1979. In the new
rural world of money, markets, corruption and clans, the weak can be bullied
and preyed upon by the strong. Having a son can help a family avoid the
miserable fate of being among the weak.
Ironically, and tragically, the state’s own policy has helped further to
inscribe and reproduce this traditional world view (Greenhalgh and Li, 1995;
Anagnost, 1995). After the extreme and ill-advised sterilization campaign in
1983, and in the wake of growing evidence of female infanticide, the state
belatedly responded by simply reversing itself on the crucial issue of the
value of female offspring. In the early-1980s, the thrust of the education
campaign had been on repudiating the feudal idea that males (traditionally
called a “big happiness”) were superior to females (a “little happiness”), and
insisting on the equal value of a boy or girl. In 1984, however, it effectively
conceded the issue by modifying rural policy to allow single-daughter couples
to try again—for a boy. Though the state did not ofﬁcially endorse the cultural
preference for males, it did concede the economic and social realities that
made sons more valuable. With the abandonment of collective agriculture
and limited community health and welfare beneﬁts, and with men privileged
in the process of distributing collective goods (e.g. land, contracts, equipment),
the importance of a son for prosperity and security was reinforced. Rather
than challenge that reality and risk further rural unrest, the state chose to
concede the issue. Single-daughter households were given special dispensation
to have a second child—to try again for a son.
Although the 1984 policy change merely legitimized what was already
the de facto rural policy in many areas, its effect was to split the state’s
ideological hegemony into two conﬂicting spheres—one sphere that applied
to all urban residents, state cadres and administrative personnel, and another
that applied to the peasantry. Rural women were thus left in the tragic situation
of being caught in the crosshairs of two mutually exclusive modes of discourse.
With no means of escaping this dual subjugation, many chose, or were
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forced by family members to choose, a strategy of accommodation that
guaranteed the birth of a son. Those who could not achieve this result were
vulnerable to a lifetime of pity, social ridicule and self-blame.28
In the early-1980s, when collective life, limited cash income, and restrictions
on travel severely constrained the options of rural families, some took the
desperate course of female infanticide to preserve the chance to have a son.
As the 1980s progressed, however, two alternative strategies of accommodation became very common. The ﬁrst was infant abandonment, which increased
in the late-1980s and 1990s in response to a tightening of the birth control
policies (Johnson et al. 1998). Civil affairs officials, who have primary
responsibility for the system of social welfare institutes (orphanages) that
care for abandoned and orphaned children, offered no reliable estimates of
the size of the problem by the 1990s, though some reports suggested that
as many as 160,000 were abandoned annually, the vast majority of them
female. As Kay Johnson has argued, however, this ﬁgure likely underestimated
the size of the problem, since many abandoned girls never entered state
institutions such as those managed by the civil affairs bureaucracy (Johnson
1996; Johnson et al. 1998). Instead, birth parents often try to identify likely
prospects for adopting the child, e.g. couples with a son but without a daughter.
Even more ominous is the escalating incidence of sex-selective abortion
and its impact on China’s sex ratio. In 1979, China produced its ﬁrst ultrasound
B machine, designed for a variety of diagnostic purposes, including pregnancy
monitoring. By 1982, mass production of ultrasound equipment had begun,
and imports added to the number in use. Thirteen thousand ultrasound
machines were in use in hospitals and clinics by 1987, or roughly six machines
for each county. By the early-1990s, all county hospitals and clinics, and
most township clinics and family planning stations had ultrasound equipment
capable of fetal sex determination.29 Henan Province, for example, spent 4
million yuan during the 1991–95 plan period to equip its 2,300-plus township
technical service centres with ultrasound scanners.30 Private clinics also
ﬂourished, as technicians took advantage of an emergent market.
Despite repeated attempts by the state to outlaw the use of ultrasound
technology to determine the sex of a fetus, easy access to the technology,
combined with the lure of lucrative bribes and consultation fees, made ultrasound use vastly popular. This was especially true in many county towns
and rural townships, where prosperity and proximity facilitated ultrasound
diagnosis, but where modest degrees of upward mobility had done little to
undermine the cultural prejudice and practical logic that favored male
offspring. Young couples raised in a village but now employed in township
factories and living in the township seat may have been far more willing
than their peers a decade earlier to have only two children. If the ﬁrst were
a girl, however, it remained vital to many that the second be a boy (Chu
2001). They may have been modern in their preference for a small family
in order to hold on to their new-found prosperity, but when it came to
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desiring a son, tradition and contemporary social realities conspired. Because
township and village cadres tacitly agreed with them, they could count on
them to look the other way when they made their pay-off to the medical
technician. The cadres, after all, would much prefer to see couples resort to
induced abortion of females to guarantee having a son, rather than have a
second daughter and be tempted to try again, as many two-daughter households
did. If the couple kept trying for a son, the local birth plan was threatened.
If the couple used available technology to guarantee the birth of a son, the
cadres’ problem was solved.31
The impact of sex-selective abortion on China’s sex ratio has become a
national scandal. In 1982, the Chinese sex ratio at birth, 107.2 males for
every 100 females, was already slightly in excess of the world norm of
105–6 males for every 100 females. Though this ﬁgure raised questions
about female infanticide and “missing girls,” those questions were dismissed
by Chinese spokesmen, who argued that the sex ratio was well within normal
bounds and in keeping with China’s own population history. Over the next
two decades, however, the sex ratio at birth rose dramatically, to 111.2 in
1985, 113.8 in 1989, 116 in 1992 and 117.4 in 1995. It continued to climb
over the next ﬁve years, and hit a high of 119 at the time of the 2000 census.
Some of this increase was evident in ﬁrst births, but much more of it was
reﬂected in second and higher-order births. In 1990, the ﬁgures for second
and third or higher-order births were 121 and 127, respectively. By 2000,
they had skyrocketed to 151.9 and 159.4 (Riley 2004).32
Some of this gap can be accounted for by the underreporting of female
births. Underreporting is suggested both by surveys of rural areas that reveal
“hidden” births not reported in ofﬁcial statistical reports, and by the lessening
of the sex ratio imbalance for school-age children. In the 1992 sample
survey, the sex ratio for the age 0–4 cohort was a very skewed 113.9. For
the age 5–9 cohort, however, the ratio dropped to 107.81. This decline is
what would be expected if previously unreported females were registered
for school and then placed on local population rolls. Such children might
never have appeared in vital statistics on births and deaths, sparing local
ofﬁcials the embarrassment of exceeding their local birth targets. Once older,
however, they may be registered as migrants or adoptees, and the degree of
male bias in the sex ratio declines accordingly.
In the early-1990s, Chinese demographers argued that such underreporting
accounted for anywhere from 43 to 75 percent of the skew in the sex ratio
at birth (Zeng et al. 1993). Subsequently, however, as the skew grew more
extreme, Chinese authorities admitted the scope of the problem, and by the
mid-2000s it was estimated that China was missing approximately 10 million
girls. Concerned over the implications of this number for social stability, the
authorities have worked to stem the tide by developing campaigns that
emphasize support and care for girls, and they have instituted a system that
is designed to provide more rewards and incentives to parents of daughters,
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as compared to parents of sons. One factor that helps to account for this
push is the growing evidence that the sex ratio imbalance is not contained
to rural areas, as was initially thought. The results of a 1995 sample survey
revealed that urban areas were also experiencing skewed sex ratios. Beijing,
for example, registered an overall sex ratio at birth of 122.6, and 148.8 for
second and higher-parity births. This high sex ratio at birth placed Beijing
on a par with such provinces as Jiangsu (125.1), Fujian (126.2), Jiangxi
(129.1), Henan (128.0), Hubei (134.6), Guangdong (125.2) and Shaanxi
(125.4). Tianjin also came in high, with an overall sex ratio at birth of 110.6
and a rate of 142.9 for second and higher-parity births. And while Shanghai’s
overall rate was within a normal range, the rate for second and higher-parity
births was an exceptionally high 175.0 (Gao et al. 1997). Similar ﬁgures
were reported in the 2000 census. For example, Guangdong province registered
a sex ratio at birth of 136, despite being one of the most prosperous and
developed regions of the country (Riley 2004).
Although the one-child policy is no doubt a contributing factor in producing
these alarming ﬁgures, they are consistent with trends elsewhere in Asia
where son preference remains strong. South Korea, Taiwan and India all
registered increases in the male to female sex ratio as ultrasound technology
became widely available (Park and Cho 1995; Das Gupta and Bhat 1997;
Eberstadt 1998). The sex ratio in India, like China, climbed continuously
during the 1990s, demonstrating clearly that the problem is not limited to
China, nor is it merely the result of the one-child policy. Rather, it is a
cultural and structural problem, one that cannot be explained away (as the
CCP has sought to do) as the product of rural backwardness. The results of
a major survey undertaken in late-2005, however, show clearly that the sex
ratio imbalance in China continued to worsen between 2000 and 2005, and
that the distortion is heavily concentrated in second and higher order births.
This consistent pattern is indicative of the impact of strict birth limits, as
those who have more than one child feel compelled to make sure the second
child is a male. The result, the survey showed, was that boys under the age
of 20 outnumber girls by 32 million, and that in 2005 alone, there were
more than 1.1 million extra males among newborns.33
The Chinese case, which pits state control over child-bearing against deeply
imbedded cultural prejudices and child-bearing preferences, remains unique.
China’s relentless emphasis since the 1970s on sheer numbers of births—on
targets, quotas and per capita accounting—combined with its neglect of
women’s issues and its gendered politics of reproduction, has opened up the
space within which an accommodative style of resistance can grow. Just as
new birth control technologies and surgical advances facilitated the state’s
move to engineer child-bearing, so too has technology become the medium
through which couples struggle to engineer the sex composition of their
offspring. They may accommodate the state’s birth limitation policy, but they
seek to do it on their own terms, rejecting in the process the state’s claim of
ideological hegemony.
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Resistance and the prospects for policy change
The struggle for dominion over child-bearing in China has led to paradox,
tragedy and irony. The paradox we are confronted with in China’s experience
of the one-child policy is the simultaneous existence of massive evidence
demonstrating the state’s capacity to engineer child-bearing, and massive
evidence of resistance, including successful resistance. The tragedy of the
policy is that it has forced a large portion of the population to choose
between two types of hegemonic discourse—a socialist, nationalist and
developmental one that emphasizes duty to the collective society, and a
patriarchal one that emphasizes duty to family and ancestors.
The sad irony of this case is that if the one- or two-child birth limit is
eventually lifted, it may be due more to countless acts of accommodation
than to traditional acts of resistance. The ultrasound technology that allows
couples to discover the sex of the fetus, combined with the prosperity that
has led to its widespread distribution, has made it possible for those caught
between the state’s discourse linking modernization and prosperity to birth
planning and a secondary, state-complicit, cultural discourse linking status
and dignity to male offspring to attempt to accommodate both. The consequences, however, have been alarming enough to produce a type of “voice”
that is increasingly urgent in content, but corporate in structure and nonconfrontational in tone.34 The core constituencies behind this “voice” are
demographers, family planning ofﬁcials and Women’s Federation ofﬁcials
who are alarmed about the implications of current trends with sex ratios and
rapid population aging. The skewed sex ratios mean an impending shortage
of wives for as many as 30 to 50 million men, which the Women’s Federation
rightly describes as an “army of bachelors.” Since the marriage market places
poor men at the greatest disadvantage in competing for a wife, this shortfall
of brides could have explosive social consequences, particularly in poorer
rural communities. And rapid fertility decline, coupled with increasing life
expectancy, means that over the next several decades China’s population will
age almost as rapidly as the populations of Western Europe, North America
and Japan. In these countries, which enjoy wealth and national systems of
welfare, anxieties about rapid population aging are already drawing leadership
attention. China will face similar levels of elderly dependence without either
of those advantages, and with a demographic structure in which a shrinking
proportion of the population will have to support a very large population of
both old and young.
Those who worry about these negative side-effects of the one-child policy
have advocated a modiﬁed and less coercive approach to population control,
some since the early-1980s. As insiders within the system of population
institutes, think tanks and academic departments, however, they have had to
be very cautious in how, and to what degree, they challenge the reigning
orthodoxy (Greenhalgh 2001). By 1998, however, they had succeeded in
getting the national leadership to launch an experiment in several counties
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implementing what was described as a genuinely voluntary family planning
programme, one that stressed positive incentives to limit childbirth rather
than mandatory control. The expansion of this project, supported by the
United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), is a hopeful sign
that over the next decade, China might ﬁnally and very gradually shed its
crude and mechanical approach to population control. Although residents in
the project areas were limited to two children, a constraint that makes it
impossible to describe the approach as truly voluntary, birth permits and
quotas were eliminated, and couples were given more freedom of choice on
when to give birth and what type of contraceptive to use.35
Progress remains slow, however, as reports of new local campaigns make
clear. In 2001, for example, family planning ofﬁcials in Guangdong’s Huaiji
county were given a target of 20,000 abortions or sterilizations by year’s
end, a campaign goal triggered by the 2000 census, which revealed their
failure to meet local population control targets. After local complaints and
media reports surfaced, local ofﬁcials were ordered to stop the campaign
and undergo reeducation on how properly to implement the family planning
policy. The Huaiji campaign was followed, however, by campaign mobilizations in Linyi City, Shandong, and Bobai county, Guangxi, in 2005 and
2007, both of which gained notoriety for the use of coercion. The impulse
to rely on such strong-arm tactics remains deeply imbedded, and will shape
the behavior of local ofﬁcials as long as their superiors reward them for the
achievement of birth control targets and don’t ask questions about how the
targets were achieved.36
Modest though the changes have been thus far, advocates of policy reform
have been aided in recent years by conditions that were not present when
the one-child policy was adopted in 1979. First, those born after 1978 and
now entering their child-bearing years have grown up against the backdrop
of rapid development, increased prosperity and the one-child policy. Their
hopes and dreams often center on leaving the village, or alternatively, on
leaving agricultural work. The images brought to them from the vastly
expanded communications networks and opportunities for travel reinforce
the idea of the urban, one-child family as the symbol of modernity. As a
result, many of today’s young rural couples may simply take for granted the
message that had to be drilled into the generation before them—that their
lives will be more prosperous and secure if they choose to have fewer children
(Chu 2001). If this proves to be true, if the new world they have grown up
in has instilled a genuine desire for a one- or two-child family, then moving
towards a more voluntary approach to birth planning without risking a
signiﬁcant fertility rebound should be feasible.
A second and more important factor that has encouraged advocates of
reform is a shift in the global discourse on population growth and women’s
rights. When China began to implement its one-child policy in 1979, it was
widely lauded by those in the international family planning community who
subscribed to the dominant theory that population growth was a primary, if
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not the primary, impediment to economic growth. For them, China’s acceptance of this position, and its determination to place tight curbs on population
growth, was so important that the very disturbing methods by which China
sought to achieve its aims were often overlooked. By the mid-1990s, another
school of thought began to dominate the discourse on population and
development. This alternative approach, which was crystallized in Cairo at
the 1994 United Nations International Conference on Population and
Development, emphasizes the importance of alleviating poverty, improving
the status of women and protecting women’s rights (including reproductive
rights and labor rights) as the more just and effective approach to population
issues.
Those in China in a position to argue persuasively for a change in China’s
methods and goals were aided by this shift in the global discourse and
agenda. In the early 1970s, China’s leaders quietly but radically embraced
the dominant Western demographic theory of the time—that reducing
population growth was a prerequisite for socioeconomic development, and
that the overpopulated nations of the developing world could not afford to
wait for a development-induced demographic transition like that which
occurred in Europe. In the post-Mao era, this theory has legitimated the
regime’s insistence that population control is the linchpin of the modernization
strategy, even as it has come under increased international criticism.
The new language of Cairo—protecting women’s rights and taking a more
holistic approach to achieving demographic goals—emerged at a time when
the State Family Planning Commission (SFPC) was growing more concerned
about the consequences of using coercion and harsh sanctions to achieve
China’s population targets (Greenhalgh 2001). The failure to achieve national
targets during the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1986–90), a failure that was
documented by the 1990 census, led to a new crackdown in the early 1990s
that got quick results but left in its wake new concerns about excessive
coercion, rising sex ratios at birth and rapid population ageing. The Cairo
agenda gave Chinese ofﬁcials a framework through which to articulate these
concerns, and provided institutional contacts and resources they could use
to experiment with a softer approach to enforcement. The UN’s Fourth
World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 reinforced the Cairo message,
provoked a new wave of feminist thinking and action, and further encouraged
SFPC ofﬁcials to consider a more client-centred approach that gave greater
consideration to women’s needs and their reproductive health (Greenhalgh
2001).
Still, the road to reform has been slow and rife with controversy. After
some internal debate, China officially reaffirmed its one-child policy in
2000, and in 2001 passed a long-debated Population and Family Planning
Law that upheld the existing policy and gave compliance the force of law.
A new central document was issued in 2005 that also underscored the
importance of staying the course. Although the law and the 2005 document
included provisions that echoed the Cairo and Beijing conference agendas,
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calling for an “informed choice of safe, effective, and appropriate contraceptive
methods,” and one prohibiting ofﬁcials from infringing on “personal rights,
property rights, or other legitimate rights and interests,” they also reafﬁrmed
China’s basic approach to population control. Nevertheless, the debate over
whether and when to bring an end to the one-child policy has become an
integral part of the discourse on China’s population policy, and not a moment
too soon. The ﬁrst generation of children born under the one-child policy
has now come of age, and they have entered their peak childbearing years.
How they respond to their own childbearing preferences, and what those
preferences are, will be crucial to the future of China’s population policy.
No matter what that future proves to be, the legacy of the one-child policy
will live on. It has added to the urban–rural divide by creating an urban
sector of one-child households and a rural sector of mostly two- or multichild households. It has traded reduced rates of population growth for increased
rates of population aging that threaten to slow China’s fast march to advanced
modernization. And it has led to a dearth of females that will ripple across
China’s demographic landscape for decades to come. It is the state that has
taught the population that the social engineering of childbearing is a legitimate
and virtuous course. Now that individual couples have a modern, efﬁcient
and hi-tech method by which to engineer the sex composition of their own
households, the dangers that have always been inherent in such a course are
becoming clear. Ideological exhortation alone will not solve this contradiction.
To overcome it, the state will also have to alter the structural conditions and
policies that encourage the continued cultural and social subordination of
women.
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